Law 798: Seminar in Neuroscience & Responsibility
We will start with the use(s) of intentions and other mental states as markers of moral blameworthiness and legal punishability. We will explore the psychological presuppositions of what such states must be like to play the role they do in our responsibility ascriptions. Then we will look at some neuroscience literature challenging those presuppositions. We will explore issues like: are wills free in any contra-causal sense of the word? Do they need to be for responsibility? Are intentions casually efficacious in producing voluntary bodily movement, or are they merely epiphenomenal with the bodily movements they putatively cause? What is the role of consciousness in our responsibility assessments? Can one have an intention, wish, willing, etc., without consciousness of them, in the appropriate sense?
Sequence and Prerequisites: None
Evaluation: Two papers, there is no final examination.